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Official food control inspections (official inspections) of food establishments and third party28
audits of food safety management systems (FSMSs) based on international standards both29
focus on food safety, which has raised discussions on whether FSMSs and their audits could30
reduce official inspections in food establishments. The aim of this study was to investigate31
whether the findings of official inspections and third party audits in food establishments are in32
alignment and to survey the inspectors’ and food business operators’ (FBOs) perceptions of33
official inspections and audits. The results can be used in planning the use of audit results as34
part of official food control. The results show that both inspectors and auditors recognized35
non-compliances/non-conformities, but significant discrepancies between the findings of36
official inspections and audits existed, making the utilization of audit results challenging.37
However, most of the FBOs and inspectors agreed that official inspections and audits overlap,38
and the majority also agreed that audits of a certified FSMS could under certain circumstances39
reduce official inspections.40
41













Food business operators (FBOs) are responsible for food safety in their establishment (EC,54
2002) and are obligated to comply with the general hygiene requirements and Hazard55
Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) principles stipulated in European Union (EU)56
regulations (EC, 2004a). FBOs implement self-checking programmes, for example, for57
sanitation, pest control, traceability and HACCP to fulfil these requirements. The premises58
and operations, including the self-checking programmes, are regularly inspected by the59
official food control (food control). In addition to the implementation of the requirements for60
food safety legislation, many FBOs implement food safety management systems (FSMSs)61
based on commercial international food safety standards (Lee, 2006; Trienekens & Zuurbier,62
2008) such as those of the British Retail Consortium (BRC), the International Organization63
for Standardizations (ISO 22000) and the Food Safety System Certification (FSSC) 2200064
(Mensah & Julien, 2011; Qijun & Batt, 2016) for food safety reasons and customers’65
requirements (Crandall, van Loo, O’Bryan, Mauromoustakos, Yiannas, Dyenson, & Berdnik,66
2012; Fulponi, 2006). These standard-based FSMSs are audited by third party auditing bodies,67
which issue a certificate to the food business upon compliance with the standard (BRC, 2017;68
FSSC, 2016). Both food safety legislation and standards focus on food safety, and the69
implementation generates costs for FBOs (EC, 2004a,b; Trienekens & Zuurbier, 2008). This70
has raised discussions on the overlapping of official inspections and audits and on whether71
third party audits of FSMS could have a role in food control (Anonymous, 2013; CFIA, 2016;72
Martinez, Verbrugge, & Fearne, 2013; Räsänen & Vastamäki, 2016; Verbruggen & Havinga,73
2015; Wright, Palmer, Shahriyer, Williams, & Smith, 2013).74
75
EU legislation states that the food control should take into account the results of quality76
assurance programmes (EC, 2004b), and some countries have included the possibility to77
utilize FSMS and the audits of those in food control (Räsänen & Vastamäki, 2016). In EU78
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countries such as Belgium, Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands, the frequency of the79
official inspections can be reduced according to certain preconditions in food businesses with80
a certified FSMS (Räsänen & Vastamäki, 2016). In addition, Canada has declared a policy81
statement including this possibility (CFIA, 2016), and the US has contemplated a role for82
third party audits (FDA, 2017), showing that there is a wide interest in taking FSMSs into83
account in food control. Studies, however, on the comparability of official inspection and84
audit results have not been published according to the knowledge of the authors.85
86
The utilization of FSMSs and their results in food control has raised concerns due to87
differences in the practices between food control and third party audits (Martinez et al., 2013;88
Wright et al. 2013; Räsänen and Vastamäki, 2016). Audits are carried out at least annually89
(FSSC, 2016; GFSI, 2011), and the FBO is usually aware of the audit well in advance, but90
most of the official inspections must be carried out unannounced. Furthermore, food control is91
risk based, which means that the risks involved with food operations influence the frequency92
of the official inspections (EC, 2004b; Evira, 2017). A major difference is that food control is93
independent from the food businesses, with the primary aim of safeguarding consumers (EC,94
2004b), whereas the certification bodies are part of the market economy (Martinez et al.,95
2013). Economic interest involved with private standards may cause risks (Martinez et al.,96
2013) and, for example, has led to speculation on whether non-compliances could go97
unnoticed (Verbruggen & Havinga, 2015). In slaughterhouses in the Netherlands meat safety98
was considered to have decreased as a consequence of increasing the responsibility of the99
FBOs, but decreasing official control (Anonymous, 2014). Because the use of FSMSs and100
audits of those in food control raises such questions, it is important to investigate the101
comparability of official inspection and audit results.102
103
The aim of our study is to investigate whether the findings of official inspections and third104
5
party audits in food premises are in alignment with the special focus on non-compliances105
observed in official inspections and non-conformities in audits. Furthermore, we will106
investigate the perceptions of FBOs and local food control inspectors (inspectors) of official107
inspections and audits. The results can be used in developing the utilization of audits of108
FSMSs in food control.109
110
2. Material and methods111
2.1. Official inspection and audit reports112
Food establishments that were members of the Finnish Food and Drink Industries’ Federation113
were asked to participate in the study. Only food establishments that could provide both114
official inspection and audit reports from a one- to two-year period were included. Ten food115
establishments provided the data required (Table 1). The data comprised 66 official inspection116
and 18 audit reports. The official inspections and audits were conducted between the years117
2013 and 2015. Among the 10 establishments, the certified FSMS based on ISO 22000 was118
the most frequent (Table 1). The official inspections were performed by different inspectors in119
different local food control units. The audits were performed by four international audit120
organisations and seven different auditors.121
122
The inspected and audited issues were divided into 21 categories (Fig. 1). Observed non-123
compliance or non-conformity and possible time-limits for correction of those were detected124
from the official inspection and audit reports. The depth of the official inspection or the audit125
was not assessed because the official inspection and audit reports did not consequently126
describe how the official inspections or audits were performed, how thoroughly an area was127
covered and what kind of inspection and audit techniques were used.  This study did not128
compare whether the legislation and the standards contained the same requirements, but129
focused on comparing official inspections and audits based on the reports.130
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2.2. Questionnaire for inspectors and FBOs131
Local food control inspectors’ and FBOs’ views on food safety legislation and standards and132
official inspections and audits were inquired in spring 2015 with an electronic questionnaire133
(E-lomake, Eduix Oy). The questionnaire was sent to all local food control units in Finland134
(62 units) and to the members of the Finnish Food and Drink Industries’ Federation (260135
companies). The name of the local food control unit was not enquired to ensure the136
confidentiality of the responding inspectors. Therefore, the response rate was not possible to137
calculate. The FBOs were instructed to provide answers from only one person per food138
business. The FBOs were asked about the production type, the number of personnel (<10, 10-139
49, 50-249, ≥250) to describe the size of the establishment, and the existence of a certified140
FSMS at the food establishment. Sections for both respondent groups included the141
respondents’ knowledge and perceptions of legislation and standards and views on the142
overlapping of official inspections and audits. The FBOs were further asked about the143
expertise of the inspectors and auditors and the impact of the official inspections and audits.144
The questionnaire consisted of multiple-choice questions and open-ended questions. The145
multiple-choice questions followed a four-step Likert scale (totally disagree, somewhat146
disagree, somewhat agree, totally agree). The impact of the official inspections and audits on147
food safety risk management was measured on a four-step scale (not at all, somewhat, clearly,148
very clearly). One reminder was sent.149
150
2.3. Statistical analysis151
We employed SPSS 22.0 (IBM, USA) software for a quantitative statistical analysis. The152
difference in the occurrence of non-compliances and non-conformities was tested with the153
Fisher exact test, which is applied in dichotomous values. The significance of the differences154
between the answers of the inspectors and FBOs were tested with the Mann-Whitney test155
(suitable for testing the difference between two groups), and the significance of the number of156
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personnel with the Kruskall-Wallis test (suitable for testing the difference between several157
groups). Both tests are nonparametric and can be used for small sample sizes. The differences158
in the opinions of the FBOs representing establishments handling food of animal origin or159
other establishments was also tested the with Mann-Whitney test. The Wilcoxson Signed160
ranks test, which is used to testing the distribution of dependent samples, was applied for the161
FBOs’ assessment of the inspections and audits. The statistical significance was considered at162
95% confidence intervals (p < 0.05).163
164
3. Results165
3.1. Non-compliances/non-conformities observed in official inspections and audits166
The frequency of non-compliances/non-conformities varied greatly between the official167
inspections and audits according to the reports (Fig. 1). The official inspection reports168
contained significantly more remarks on non-compliance concerning cross-contamination,169
maintenance, hygienic working methods, sanitation and sampling than the audit reports on170
non-conformities (p < 0.05), (Fig. 1). In some categories, such as HACCP and recall, the171
frequency of non-conformities was higher in the audits than of non-compliances in official172
inspections, although the difference was not statistically significant (Fig. 1).173
174
Time limits for the correction of non-conformities was set on every non-conformity observed175
at the audits, according to the reports. The frequency of setting time limits for non-176
compliances observed in official inspections varied greatly. Most frequently a time limit was177
set for the correction of non-compliances concerning by-products (50%), waste management178
(33%), maintenance (26%), sanitation (25%) and separation of hygiene areas (25%). No time179
limits were set for non-compliances such as hygienic working methods or temperature control180
according to the reports.181
182
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3.2. Respondents of the questionnaire and their knowledge of food safety legislation and183
standards184
The number of responding inspectors from local food control units was 28 and of the 260185
members of Finnish Food and Drink Industries’ Federation, 42 (response rate 16%). Among186
these FBOs 74% (31/42) had a certified FSMS (Table 2). One of the FBO’s FSMS was based187
on BRC, while 28 FBOs that specified their FSMS relied on ISO 22000 and 19 FBOs on188
FSSC 22000. Both FBOs handling products of animal origin and other food establishments189
were represented among the respondents (Table 2). The size of the food establishments190
according to the number of personnel was as follows: 50-249 (55%), 10-49 (21%), > 250191
(19%) and < 10 persons (5%).192
193
All but one FBO (97%, 37/38) and half of the inspectors (50%, 14/28) reported to have at194
least some knowledge of a food safety standard. The most commonly known standard among195
FBOs and inspectors was ISO 22000 (90% and 29% were familiar with the standard196
respectively). However, most of the inspectors (86%) stated that they need more information197
about food safety standards, and 33% reported that they need more information concerning198
food safety legislation. Among the FBOs, 46% needed more information on food safety199
legislation and its implementation (Table 3). There were no significant differences in the200
answers of the FBOs according to the size of the food business.201
202
3.3. Overlapping of food safety legislation and standards203
The majority of inspectors and FBOs evaluated that food safety is sufficiently included in204
food safety legislation (96% and 98% respectively) and in the official inspections (100% and205
95% respectively) (Table 3). The majority of inspectors and FBOs assessed that standards and206
audits include food safety sufficiently; however, significantly fewer inspectors than FBOs207
were of this opinion (p < 0.001) (Table 3). All of the inspectors and the majority of the FBOs208
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(90%) totally or partly agreed that food safety legislation and standards overlap, and the209
majority of the respondents assessed that the inspectors inspect and the auditors audit same210
issues (Table 3). No significant differences were observed in the answers between211
establishments of different sizes or the existence of a certified FSMS or not.212
213
The FBOs and especially the inspectors stated that inconsistencies exist in the demands of the214
inspectors and auditors (p < 0.001) (Table 3). Interestingly, the analysis showed that the FBOs215
with a certified FSMS reported significantly fewer inconsistencies (21%, 6/28) than the FBOs216
with no certified FSMS (100%, 10/10) (p < 0.001). The analysis showed that inspectors with217
no knowledge of a food safety standard were of the opinion that there were more218
inconsistencies than inspectors with at least some knowledge (93%, 13/14 and 67%, 8/12,219
respectively), although the difference was not statistically significant (p > 0.05).220
Unfortunately, only a few respondents specified how the demands were inconsistent. One221
FBO commented that the auditor’s approach is more theoretical than the inspector’s, and one222
inspector stated that the auditor requires more in general, but not concerning production223
hygiene issues.224
225
Almost all respondents agreed totally or partly that a certified FSMS could reduce official226
inspections (Table 3). Both FBOs (11/42) and inspectors (3/28) commented that the frequency227
of official inspections or inspection time could be reduced (Table 3). However, two inspectors228
stated that any reductions in official inspections should be preceded by an evaluation of how229
the FSMS meets the food safety legislation requirements and that the inspector should have230
access to the criteria used in audits.231
232
3.4. The FBO’s perceptions on inspectors’ and auditors’ expertise and the impact on233
food safety234
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The FBOs evaluated the auditors’ and inspectors’ expertise on food safety legislation as good235
on average (mean 3.5 and 3.4 respectively) (Fig. 2). Most of the FBOs also totally or partly236
agreed that auditors and inspectors interpret the requirements of the food safety legislation in237
a practical way (mean 3.6 and 3.1 respectively) (p < 0.01). The FBOs handling food of animal238
origin assessed the expertise in food safety legislation and the ability to interpret the239
requirements of the legislation in a practical way better than the FBOs representing other food240
establishments (Fig. 2). This difference between the establishments handling food of animal241
origin and other establishments was significant concerning the inspectors’ expertise on food242
safety legislation (p = 0.046) and the auditors’ expertise on interpreting the requirements of243
the legislation in a practical way (p = 0.047). No significant differences in the answers were244
observed between the size of the food businesses.245
246
The FBOs evaluated that audits (100% of the FBOs) and official inspections (90% of the247
FBOs) had improved food safety risk management (Wilcoxon signed ranks test, p < 0.001).248
The food risk management had improved very clearly due to audits, as reported by 30% of the249
FBOs, and official inspections, as reported by 15% of the FBOs (Fig. 3). The majority of the250
FBOs’ totally or partly agreed that auditors’ and inspectors’ demands to correct non-251
conformities/non-compliances were easy to fulfil (84%, 26/31 and 69%, 23/33 respectively)252
(Wilcoxon signed ranks test p > 0.05).253
254
4. Discussion255
The study reveals differences between official inspections and audits, which are important to256
take into account when assessing the utilization of audit results in food control. It is especially257
important to acknowledge that there were significant differences in the observation of non-258
compliances in official inspections and non-conformities in audits. The differences were259
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observed in important self-checking categories, for example, maintenance of the premises and260
sanitation, which may have serious consequences on food safety.261
262
The observed differences can be due to many reasons, such as the inspectors’ and auditors’263
ability to recognize non-compliances/non-conformities. Discrepancies between official264
inspections (Läikkö-Roto, Mäkelä, Lundén, Heikkilä, & Nevas, 2015) and between audits265
(Albersmeier, Schulze, Jahn, & Spiller, 2009) have been observed earlier, but differences in266
observations between official inspections and audits on site have not been investigated before.267
Differences in the observation of non-compliances and non-conformities can also arise from268
the fact that official inspections and audits were not performed at the same time and are a269
snapshot of a specific point in time (Jacxsens, Kirezieva, Luning, Ingelrham, Diricks, &270
Uyttendaele, 2015). It is normal that non-compliances occur and are corrected, which means271
that the situation in the establishment is not identical from one day to another. However, the272
differences observed in this study were major, the extent and magnitude of the observed273
differences were surprising, and it is not likely that they can be solely explained by different274
on-site visit times.275
276
Another factor that can affect the results is the unexpectedness of the official inspections or277
the expectedness of the audits. Most of the official inspections must be unannounced, but278
audits have been announced in advance, which may influence the authenticity of the situation279
at the establishment. To overcome this issue, the conduction of unannounced audits is also280
being included as a requirement in some standards (Räsänen & Vastamäki, 2016). Further, it281
can be hypothesised that the expertise of the inspectors and auditors and time available for282
carrying out official inspections and audits may influence the outcome. Whatever the reasons283
are for the discrepancy observed between official inspections and audits, it makes comparison284
of the official inspection and audit results difficult, which poses a challenge to the utilization285
12
of audit reports in food control. Actions to decrease discrepancies could include, for example,286
joint visits of inspectors and auditors to establishments and availability of the criterion that the287
auditors use, when assessing findings, to inspectors.288
289
The majority of inspectors stated that there are inconsistencies between the demands of the290
inspectors and auditors. However, only few inspectors specified what the inconsistencies291
were, suggesting that most of the inspectors do not have any concrete examples of292
inconsistent demands. Further, all FBOs not having a FSMS agreed that there are293
inconsistencies, whereas most of the FBOs that did have a certified FSMS did not agree.294
These results indicate that inspectors and FBOs not familiar with the topic have a strong295
impression of audits and official inspections being inconsistent, although in reality this might296
not always be the case.297
298
Most of the FBOs with a certified FSMS and those few inspectors with some knowledge of a299
food safety standard agreed that food safety legislation and standards overlap. This is not300
surprising since most of the respondents also assessed that food safety is sufficiently included301
in both food safety legislation and standards. Consequently, the majority also agreed that a302
certified FSMS could reduce official inspections or inspection categories. It seems therefore303
that Finland has a willingness to utilize the results of audits in official control, as in many304
other countries (FDA, 2017; Räsänen & Vastamäki, 2016). Suggestions, however, to reduce305
the frequency of official inspections or reduce control of certain inspection categories should306
not be made unless the reasons for the discrepancies between official inspection and audit307
results are investigated. At the moment audit results are not actively utilized in food control in308
Finland, such as, for example, in Belgium and Denmark (Räsänen & Vastamäki, 2016).309
However, audits can indirectly influence official inspection results in Finland; if audits result310




Both official inspections and audits appear to be important for food safety, as they have314
impacted food safety risk management according to the FBOs. This finding is in line with315
previous findings suggesting that official control and certified FSMS improve food safety316
(Dzwolak, 2016; Escanciano & Santos-Vijande, 2014; Kettunen, Nevas, & Lundén, 2015;317
Nevas, Kalenius, & Lundén, 2013; Psomas & Kafetzopoulos, 2015; Qijun & Batt, 2016).318
Audits were assessed in this study to have impacted risk management more than official319
inspections. The reasons for this were not revealed, but it is possible that longer audit visits320
compared to shorter official inspections, the content of the audits and official inspections, or321
the competence of the auditors and inspectors have influenced the FBOs’ perceptions of the322
impact.323
324
The fact that both inspectors and auditors found non-compliances and non-conformities in325
food establishments is of concern; however, it is not uncommon to find non-compliances in326
official inspections (Läikkö-Roto et al., 2015; Guiducci, Copeland, Dorsey, & Edelstein,327
2011). This indicates that external control is warranted in food establishments, although the328
FBOs carry the responsibility for the safety of the products. It can also be speculated that329
more efficacious enforcement measures should be applied due to the high frequency of non-330
compliances. Time limits for the correction of non-conformities were set systematically in the331
audits, but in the official inspections time limits were not often used or they were at least not332
documented. It is possible that some of the non-compliances, for instance, non-compliances333
concerning hygienic working methods, were requested to be corrected immediately at the334
official inspection, and therefore a time limit was not documented. The use of time limits is of335
great importance because they improve the correction of non-compliances (Läikkö-Roto et al.,336
2015; Luukkanen & Lundén, 2016).337
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338
The FBOs agreed that inspectors and auditors have good expertise in food safety legislation339
and also assessed positively on average the ability of especially the auditors but also the340
inspectors to interpret legislative requirements. This is important because it has been shown341
that FBOs appreciate assistance in interpreting the requirements of legislation (Buckley, 2015;342
Kettunen, Lundén, Läikkö-Roto, & Nevas, 2017). In this study almost half of the FBOs stated343
that they need even more information about food safety legislation and its implementation,344
which is a challenge for inspectors, auditors and possible other players in the field.345
Interestingly, differences between the opinions on expertise and the ability to interpret346
requirements in a practical way were seen between the FBOs handling food of animal origin347
and the other FBOs. The reason for this was not revealed in this study, but it can be348
hypothesized that the inspectors and auditors visiting establishments handling food of animal349
origin have more in-depth training due to the risks involved with animal-derived products.350
351
The results of this study concerning official inspection and audit reports can be generalized to352
other establishments with some limitations. The number of included establishments was rather353
small, but the establishments represented different production types, and the official354
inspections and audits were carried out by several inspectors and auditors. The discrepancies355
between the findings of inspectors and auditors were also quite striking. The results of the356
questionnaire must be interpreted carefully because of the scarce number of respondents. The357
number of responding inspectors is modest, presumably because very few have knowledge of358
food safety standards. All of the responding FBOs were members of the Finnish Food and359
Drink Industries’ Federation, and therefore we do not know if FBOs that are not members360
would show a similar answering profile. However, most of the responding FBOs had a361
certified FSMS. Therefore, we hypothesize that these results can be generalized better to362
FBOs with a certified FSMS.363
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In conclusion, official inspections and audits overlap, and both inspectors and FBOs agree364
that audits of certified FSMSs could somehow reduce official control. However, this study365
shows striking differences in the observations in official inspections and audits, which makes366
the comparison of official inspections and audits challenging. The development of a367
utilization scheme of audit results as part of food control requires a better understanding of368
the reasons leading to discrepancies between audit and official inspection results.369
370
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-The majority of respondents stated that certified FSMSs could reduce inspections
-Almost half of the FBOs need more information on food safety legislation
Figure captions
Figure 1.
Frequency of non-compliances observed at official inspections (n=66) and non-conformities at
audits (n=18).
1=Cross-contamination*; 2=Maintenance*; 3=Hygienic working methods*; 4=Traceability; 5=Contact material;
6=Sanitation*; 7=Temperature control; 8=Pest control; 9=Waste management; 10=Separation of hygiene areas;
11=Personnel health; 12=Sampling*; 13=Self-inspection documentation; 14=By-products; 15=Inspection of received
products; 16=HACCP; 17=Reclamations; 18=Recall; 19=Personnel training; 20=Allergen control; 21=Labelling.
*Statistically significant difference in the number of non-compliance observed at official inspections and non-
conformities observed at audits (Fisher exact test p < 0.05).
Figure 2.
Food business operators’ evaluation of the inspectors’ and auditors’ expertise in food safety
legislation and their ability to practically interpret the requirements of the legislation.
*Only FBOs with a certified food safety management system answered.
Figure 3.
Food business operators' assessment of the impact of official inspections and audits.
*Only FBOs that had a certified food safety management system answered.
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the legislation in a practical way*    (n=11)
Auditors interpret the requirements of    (n=19)
food safety legislation*    (n=11)
Auditors have good expertise in    (n=19)
the legislation in a practical way    (n=16)
Inspectors interpret the requirements of    (n=25)
food safety legislation    (n=16)
Inspectors have good expertise in   (n=25)
1=totally disagree; 2=somewhat disagree;
3=somewhat agree; 4=totally agree
Establishment handling food of animal origin
Other food establishment
Figure 3
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Inspections have improved our food safety risk
management (N=41)
Audits have improved our food safety risk
management (N=30) *
Not at all Somewhat Clearly Very clearly
Table 1. Number and type of food establishments that provided official inspection and audit













1 1 Milk powder 1 1
1 2 Cheese 1 1
2 3 Meat product 1 1 1
3 4 Ready-to-eat product 1 1 1
3 5 Ready-to-eat product 1 1 1
4 6 Bakery product 1 1 1
5 7 Processed fishery product 1
6 8 Meat cutting 1 1 1
7 9 Processed vegetables 1
8 10 Cooking oil 1
Table 2. Respondent groups and response rates of the questionnaire and the presence of a certified food
safety management system (FSMS) in the responding food businesses.
Respondent group Number of
respondents (%)
Number of food businesses
with a FSMS (%)
Food control inspector at local unit 28a -
Food business operatorb 42 (16) 31 (74)
Establishment handling food of animal origin 26 20 (77)
Other food premisesc 16 11 (69)
aThe questionnaire did not enquire the name of the local food control unit to maintain the anonymity of
the inspectors, and therefore the percentage of the responding units cannot be calculated.
bThe questionnaire was sent to the members (n=260) of the Finnish Food and Drink Industries’
Federation. The share of establishments handling food of animal origin and other food establishments
among the members is not known.
cPremises handling vegetables, baking products, candy, beverages, berries, oil or yeast.
Table 3. Food business operators’ (FBO) and local food control inspectors’ views and the educational needs of food safety legislation and standards.







Food safety is sufficiently included in food safety standards 100 (39/39) 77 (10/13) < 0.001
Food safety is sufficiently included in food safety legislation 98 (38/39) 96 (25/26) > 0.05
Food safety is sufficiently included in audits 100 (39/39) 73 (8/11) < 0.001
Food safety is sufficiently included in official inspections 95 (37/39) 100(26/26) > 0.05
Overlapping
Requirements of food safety legislation and standards overlap 90 (28/31) 100 (8/8) > 0.05
Inspectors and auditors inspect/audit the same issues 81 (26/32) 89 (8/9) > 0.05
Inspectors’ and auditors’ demands have been inconsistent 42 (16/38) 81 (21/26) < 0.001
Certified food safety management system could reduce inspections 93 (27/29) 89 (8/9) > 0.05
Knowledge and educational needs
I have basic knowledge about at least one food safety standard 97 (37/38) 48 (13/27) < 0.001
I need more information about food safety standards 37 (15/41) 86 (24/28) < 0.001
I need more information about food safety legislation and its implementation 46 (19/41) 33 (9/27) > 0.05
Food control officials need more information about food safety standards 89 (34/38) 89 (25/28) > 0.05
aStatistical significance of the difference between groups was tested with the Mann-Whitney test.
